Riverside Info » About Riverside

  1. Catherine
    Member

    Here is an interesting summary of independent (not Wall Street) economists' views:

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/25/AR2008092504531.html

    FROM THE ACADEMICS: Away from Wall Street, Economists Question Basis of Paulson's Plan

    The Bush administration's pitch for a sweeping bailout of the financial system has centered on two simple premises: that the economy could suffer a crippling downturn if action is not taken very quickly and that this action should consist of the government buying troubled mortgage securities from banks and other institutions.

    But many of the nation's top economists disagree with one or both of those ideas, even as many top political leaders have swung behind them.

    Wall Street economists have mostly endorsed Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr.'s plan, or a variation thereof.

    But almost 200 academic economists -- who aren't paid by the institutions that could directly benefit from the plan but who also may not have recent practical experience in the markets -- have signed a petition organized by a University of Chicago professor objecting to the plan on the grounds that it could create perverse incentives, that it is too vague and that its long-run effects are unclear. Sen. Richard C. Shelby (Ala.), ranking Republican on the Budget Committee, brandished that letter yesterday afternoon as he explained his opposition to the bailout outside a bipartisan summit at the White House. The petition did not advocate any specific plan, including that offered yesterday by House Republicans.

    Economists tend to agree that the nation's economy is at serious risk as the flow of credit threatens to freeze. Just yesterday, the interest rate at which banks lend to each other rose steeply, as it has every day this week, suggesting that lenders are hoarding cash. History shows that when this happens, a broad economic crisis can follow, for instance, the Great Depression and Japan's decade-long recession in the 1990s.

    "If nothing is done, the potential for these markets to seize up in a big way is definitely there," said Frederic S. Mishkin, an economist at Columbia University who was a Federal Reserve governor until last month. "When you look at the history of these crises, when things spin out of control, the cost to fix it later goes up exponentially."

    But many others with a deep theoretical knowledge of finance and experience in government are skeptical of the structure of Paulson's plan -- and the speed with which it has been crafted.

    The critics can be roughly divided into two camps. One group thinks money should be directly infused into banks, which should allow it to trickle down through the financial system to borrowers. A second group thinks the government should buy individual mortgages, thus helping ordinary Americans more directly, with the benefits trickling up to the banks.

    The plan promoted by Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is somewhere in between: buying up packages of mortgages and hoping that the benefits spread both up to banks and down to households.

    "The plan is a trickle-down approach from banks to Main Street," said Alan S. Blinder, a professor at Princeton University. "But if you reduce the flood of foreclosures and defaults" -- which he would have the government do by buying loans directly and then renegotiating the terms -- "it will make mortgage-backed securities worth more."

    That might help ordinary Americans but would be extremely difficult to administer. The government would have to make decisions on the foreclosure and resale of individual houses all over the country. Still, many economists with left-of-center political views favor some variation of this approach to the plan endorsed by Bush.

    "There is a kind of suggestion in the Paulson proposal that if only we provide enough money to financial markets, this problem will disappear," said Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist. "But that does nothing to address the fundamental problem of bleeding foreclosures and the holes in the balance sheets of banks."

    Coming from the other direction, more conservative economists worry that by having the government buy mortgage securities, the Paulson plan would manipulate prices in that market without getting at the nub of the problem: that banks do not have enough capital and are having difficulty raising any on private markets.

    In a sign of how the debate over the economy has shifted in recent weeks, some conservatives, even as they argue for a relatively limited government role, are calling on the government to invest public money in private banks.

    "The root of the issue is recapitalizing banks," said Glenn Hubbard, dean of Columbia Business School and a former chairman of President Bush's Council of Economic Advisers. "That could be done more efficiently through the government injection of preferred equity. Then the market could figure out the prices of the assets."

    Many of these critics don't care for the assumption behind the administration's plan that the market is now pricing these mortgage securities incorrectly, a problem that the government intervention aims to fix.

    "The premise appears to be that the market is irrationally pessimistic," wrote Greg Mankiw, a Harvard University economist and another former Bush economic adviser, on his blog this week. "That might be so. Nonetheless, one has to be at least a bit skeptical about the idea that government policymakers gambling with other people's money are better at judging the value of complex financial instruments than are private investors gambling with their own."

    Some conservatives are now arguing, notably, that the government should be investing in banks.

    Many economists fault the Bush administration and Congress for moving so quickly on the bailout package without allowing more time for debate. That sentiment was reflected in the petition organized by John Cochrane of the University of Chicago. (None of the economists quoted here were signatories.)

    "I totally disagree that this needs to be done this week. It's more important to get it right," Blinder said.

    Moreover, some economists said the proposed $700 billion may not be enough to address all the problems stretching across the financial landscape. "You only show up if you can win, and this is not that package," said Simon Johnson, a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. "This cannot be the ultimate, decisive solution if you are not addressing the underlying cause."

    The plan is short on details, instead giving the Treasury secretary wide latitude to determine how to execute the purchases of mortgage securities.

    "I'd like to see how they see the evolution of an end game. There are still many questions," said Myron Scholes, a retired professor at Stanford University and Nobel Prize winner. He said how long the government holds the assets and how they are later resold would be the keys to determining whether the plan works.

    Posted Friday Sep 26, 2008 09:53 #
  2. spatny
    Member

    From the BBC:

    Bail-out debate: For and against

    As the debate rages about the US $700bn (£379bn) financial bail-out plan, BBC News looks at the arguments for and against this rescue package.
    FOR THE DEAL
    Global financial stability: the plan is aimed at bringing calm to an extremely volatile global financial system. The world's richest nations, the Group of Seven (G7) say the package will, "protect the integrity of the international financial system".
    Investor wellbeing: Investors worldwide need a shot of confidence. As billionaire investor Warren Buffett put it: the plan was "absolutely necessary" to help pull the financial system out of an "economic Pearl Harbour".
    Global slowdown: All sides agree that we want to avoid recession in the world's biggest economy and the knock-on effect that would have for countries that rely on America for trade.
    Job security: Safeguarding jobs across the economy and preventing bankruptcies that "threaten American families' financial well-being" according to US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.
    Credit freeze: Keeping funds flowing through the money markets so that financial institutions are happy to lend to each other, to businesses and to consumers is vital for any functioning economy.
    Toxic profits: The $700bn cost of mopping up banks' toxic debts may seem a high price, but when authorities eventually sell these assets in the future, their value may have risen enough to make a profit.
    AGAINST THE DEAL
    Taxpayer burden: The government plans to buy up mortgage-backed assets at its "maturity" value, which is well above the current market value. If the value of these assets does not recover in the next few years, it will get expensive for taxpayers.
    Ballooning state debt: The plan would swell the budget deficit, which could fuel inflation, economists warn (Mr Paulson has asked to raise state borrowing to $11.3 trillion, from $10.6 trillion).
    True cost of the deal or how long is piece of string? Since authorities would have the power to buy almost any asset at any price and sell it at any future date, it is almost impossible to calculate the real cost of this deal.
    Bankers' big pay: There are worries about controlling the mega-bucks bosses earn at the very banks being bailed out - given the view that it was Wall Street "that got us into this mess in the first place".
    The phenomenal power of US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson: The rescue plan is his baby and he will control how the $700bn is spent.
    Too much exposure: Some congressmen object that they want the government to have the right to take a minority stake in any firm that is being bailed out, which would give the state the right to purchase stock in companies in the future.
    Governance: The plan is a twice-yearly report - critics insist on greater oversight and reporting.
    Main Street versus Wall Street: There are calls for this package to be extended to help ordinary Americans who are at risk of losing their homes.

    Posted Friday Sep 26, 2008 09:58 #
  3. spatny
    Member

    Make your voice heard before it is too late. If you think this is a crackpot idea that - in the form it was cast in by Paulson - won't work, let your Senators and Congressional reps know how you feel. Look at the last sentence of this and see what the B of A thinks:

    September 25, 2008
    New York Times

    Economists Of The World, Unite!
    By Joe Nocera

    [Signed by about 200 economists - including three recipients of the Nobel Prize]

    To the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate:

    As economists, we want to express to Congress our great concern for the plan proposed by Treasury Secretary Paulson to deal with the financial crisis. We are well aware of the difficulty of the current financial situation and we agree with the need for bold action to ensure that the financial system continues to function. We see three fatal pitfalls in the currently proposed plan:

    1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers' expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. Not every business failure carries systemic risk. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry, able to make new loans to creditworthy borrowers, without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.

    2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight are clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, occasions and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.

    3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America's dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is desperately short-sighted.

    For these reasons we ask Congress not to rush, to hold appropriate hearings, and to carefully consider the right course of action, and to wisely determine the future of the financial industry and the U.S. economy for years to come.

    Acemoglu Daron (Massachussets Institute of Technology)
    Adler Michael (Columbia University)
    Admati Anat R. (Stanford University)
    Alexis Marcus (Northwestern University)
    Alvarez Fernando (University of Chicago)
    Andersen Torben (Northwestern University)
    Baliga Sandeep (Northwestern University)
    Banerjee Abhijit V. (Massachussets Institute of Technology)
    Barankay Iwan (University of Pennsylvania)
    Barry Brian (University of Chicago)
    Bartkus James R. (Xavier University of Louisiana)
    Becker Charles M. (Duke University)
    Becker Robert A. (Indiana University)
    Beim David (Columbia University)
    Berk Jonathan (Stanford University)
    Bisin Alberto (New York University)
    Bittlingmayer George (University of Kansas)
    Boldrin Michele (Washington University)
    Brooks Taggert J. (University of Wisconsin)
    Brynjolfsson Erik (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
    Buera Francisco J. (UCLA)
    Camp Mary Elizabeth (Indiana University)
    Carmel Jonathan (University of Michigan)
    Carroll Christopher (Johns Hopkins University)
    Cassar Gavin (University of Pennsylvania)
    Chaney Thomas (University of Chicago)
    Chari Varadarajan V. (University of Minnesota)
    Chauvin Keith W. (University of Kansas)
    Chintagunta Pradeep K. (University of Chicago)
    Christiano Lawrence J. (Northwestern University)
    Cochrane John (University of Chicago)
    Coleman John (Duke University)
    Constantinides George M. (University of Chicago)
    Crain Robert (UC Berkeley)
    Culp Christopher (University of Chicago)
    Da Zhi (University of Notre Dame)
    Davis Morris (University of Wisconsin)
    De Marzo Peter (Stanford University)
    Dubé Jean-Pierre H. (University of Chicago)
    Edlin Aaron (UC Berkeley)
    Eichenbaum Martin (Northwestern University)
    Ely Jeffrey (Northwestern University)
    Eraslan Hülya K. K.(Johns Hopkins University)
    Faulhaber Gerald (University of Pennsylvania)
    Feldmann Sven (University of Melbourne)
    Fernandez-Villaverde Jesus (University of Pennsylvania)
    Fohlin Caroline (Johns Hopkins University)
    Fox Jeremy T. (University of Chicago)
    Frank Murray Z.(University of Minnesota)
    Frenzen Jonathan (University of Chicago)
    Fuchs William (University of Chicago)
    Fudenberg Drew (Harvard University)
    Gabaix Xavier (New York University)
    Gao Paul (Notre Dame University)
    Garicano Luis (University of Chicago)
    Gerakos Joseph J. (University of Chicago)
    Gibbs Michael (University of Chicago)
    Glomm Gerhard (Indiana University)
    Goettler Ron (University of Chicago)
    Goldin Claudia (Harvard University)
    Gordon Robert J. (Northwestern University)
    Greenstone Michael (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
    Guadalupe Maria (Columbia University)
    Guerrieri Veronica (University of Chicago)
    Hagerty Kathleen (Northwestern University)
    Hamada Robert S. (University of Chicago)
    Hansen Lars (University of Chicago)
    Harris Milton (University of Chicago)
    Hart Oliver (Harvard University)
    Hazlett Thomas W. (George Mason University)
    Heaton John (University of Chicago)
    Heckman James (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)
    Henderson David R. (Hoover Institution)
    Henisz, Witold (University of Pennsylvania)
    Hertzberg Andrew (Columbia University)
    Hite Gailen (Columbia University)
    Hitsch Günter J. (University of Chicago)
    Hodrick Robert J. (Columbia University)
    Hopenhayn Hugo (UCLA)
    Hurst Erik (University of Chicago)
    Imrohoroglu Ayse (University of Southern California)
    Isakson Hans (University of Northern Iowa)
    Israel Ronen (London Business School)
    Jaffee Dwight M. (UC Berkeley)
    Jagannathan Ravi (Northwestern University)
    Jenter Dirk (Stanford University)
    Jones Charles M. (Columbia Business School)
    Kaboski Joseph P. (Ohio State University)
    Kahn Matthew (UCLA)
    Kaplan Ethan (Stockholm University)
    Karolyi, Andrew (Ohio State University)
    Kashyap Anil (University of Chicago)
    Keim Donald B (University of Pennsylvania)
    Ketkar Suhas L (Vanderbilt University)
    Kiesling Lynne (Northwestern University)
    Klenow Pete (Stanford University)
    Koch Paul (University of Kansas)
    Kocherlakota Narayana (University of Minnesota)
    Koijen Ralph S.J. (University of Chicago)
    Kondo Jiro (Northwestern University)
    Korteweg Arthur (Stanford University)
    Kortum Samuel (University of Chicago)
    Krueger Dirk (University of Pennsylvania)
    Ledesma Patricia (Northwestern University)
    Lee Lung-fei (Ohio State University)
    Leeper Eric M. (Indiana University)
    Leuz Christian (University of Chicago)
    Levine David I.(UC Berkeley)
    Levine David K.(Washington University)
    Levy David M. (George Mason University)
    Linnainmaa Juhani (University of Chicago)
    Lott John R. Jr. (University of Maryland)
    Lucas Robert (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)
    Luttmer Erzo G.J. (University of Minnesota)
    Manski Charles F. (Northwestern University)
    Martin Ian (Stanford University)
    Mayer Christopher (Columbia University)
    Mazzeo Michael (Northwestern University)
    McDonald Robert (Northwestern University)
    Meadow Scott F. (University of Chicago)
    Mehra Rajnish (UC Santa Barbara)
    Mian Atif (University of Chicago)
    Middlebrook Art (University of Chicago)
    Miguel Edward (UC Berkeley)
    Miravete Eugenio J. (University of Texas at Austin)
    Miron Jeffrey (Harvard University)
    Moretti Enrico (UC Berkeley)
    Moriguchi Chiaki (Northwestern University)
    Moro Andrea (Vanderbilt University)
    Morse Adair (University of Chicago)
    Mortensen Dale T. (Northwestern University)
    Mortimer Julie Holland (Harvard University)
    Muralidharan Karthik (UC San Diego)
    Nanda Dhananjay (University of Miami)
    Nevo Aviv (Northwestern University)
    Ohanian Lee (UCLA)
    Pagliari Joseph (University of Chicago)
    Papanikolaou Dimitris (Northwestern University)
    Parker Jonathan (Northwestern University)
    Paul Evans (Ohio State University)
    Pejovich Svetozar (Steve) (Texas A&M University)
    Peltzman Sam (University of Chicago)
    Perri Fabrizio (University of Minnesota)
    Phelan Christopher (University of Minnesota)
    Piazzesi Monika (Stanford University)
    Piskorski Tomasz (Columbia University)
    Rampini Adriano (Duke University)
    Reagan Patricia (Ohio State University)
    Reich Michael (UC Berkeley)
    Reuben Ernesto (Northwestern University)
    Roberts Michael (University of Pennsylvania)
    Robinson David (Duke University)
    Rogers Michele (Northwestern University)
    Rotella Elyce (Indiana University)
    Ruud Paul (Vassar College)
    Safford Sean (University of Chicago)
    Sandbu Martin E. (University of Pennsylvania)
    Sapienza Paola (Northwestern University)
    Savor Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)
    Scharfstein David (Harvard University)
    Seim Katja (University of Pennsylvania)
    Seru Amit (University of Chicago)
    Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University)
    Shimer Robert (University of Chicago)
    Shore Stephen H. (Johns Hopkins University)
    Siegel Ron (Northwestern University)
    Smith David C. (University of Virginia)
    Smith Vernon L.(Chapman University- Nobel Laureate)
    Sorensen Morten (Columbia University)
    Spiegel Matthew (Yale University)
    Stevenson Betsey (University of Pennsylvania)
    Stokey Nancy (University of Chicago)
    Strahan Philip (Boston College)
    Strebulaev Ilya (Stanford University)
    Sufi Amir (University of Chicago)
    Tabarrok Alex (George Mason University)
    Taylor Alan M. (UC Davis)
    Thompson Tim (Northwestern University)
    Tschoegl Adrian E. (University of Pennsylvania)
    Uhlig Harald (University of Chicago)
    Ulrich, Maxim (Columbia University)
    Van Buskirk Andrew (University of Chicago)
    Veronesi Pietro (University of Chicago)
    Vissing-Jorgensen Annette (Northwestern University)
    Wacziarg Romain (UCLA)
    Weill Pierre-Olivier (UCLA)
    Williamson Samuel H. (Miami University)
    Witte Mark (Northwestern University)
    Wolfers Justin (University of Pennsylvania)
    Woutersen Tiemen (Johns Hopkins University)
    Zingales Luigi (University of Chicago)
    Zitzewitz Eric (Dartmouth College)

    ---
    September 26, 2008
    The Washington Post

    Smaller Banks Thrive Out of the Fray of Crisis
    By Binyamin Appelbaum

    . . . "We collect money from local savers, and we lend it in the local community," said William Dunkelberg, chairman of Liberty Bell Bank in Cherry Hill, N.J. "We're doing fine. There are 9,000 financial institutions out there, and most of them are small and most of them are doing fine."

    Dunkelberg, a professor of economics at Temple University and chief economist for the National Federation of Independent Business, added that a recent survey of that group's members found that only 2 percent said getting a bank loan was the great challenge facing their businesses. . . .

    Even some of the nation's largest banks, which have pushed hard for a federal bailout, deny that the current situation is forcing them to reduce lending. "The strength of our core businesses, capital and liquidity are enabling us to continue to support our customers," Bank of America, the nation's largest bank, said in a statement.

    Posted Friday Sep 26, 2008 16:26 #
  4. spatny
    Member

    From Nouriel Roubini:

    Is Purchasing $700 billion of Toxic Assets the Best Way to Recapitalize the Financial System? No! It is Rather a Disgrace and Rip-Off Benefitting only the Shareholders and Unsecured Creditors of Banks

    PrintShare
    Nouriel Roubini | Sep 28, 2008
    Whenever there is a systemic banking crisis there is a need to recapitalize the banking/financial system to avoid an excessive and destructive credit contraction. But purchasing toxic/illiquid assets of the financial system is not the most effective and efficient way to recapitalize the banking system. Such recapitalization —“ via the use of public resources —“ can occur in a number of alternative ways: purchase of bad assets/loans; government injection of preferred shares; government injection of common shares; government purchase of subordinated debt; government issuance of government bonds to be placed on the banks' balance sheet; government injection of cash; government credit lines extended to the banks; government assumption of government liabilities.

    A recent IMF study of 42 systemic banking crises across the world provides evidence on how different crises were resolved. First of all only in 32 of the 42 cases there was government financial intervention of any sort; in 10 cases systemic banking crises were resolved without any government financial intervention. Of the 32 cases where the government recapitalized the banking system only seven included a program of purchase of bad assets/loans (like the one proposed by the US Treasury). In 25 other cases there was no government purchase of such toxic assets. In 6 cases the government purchased preferred shares; in 4 cases the government purchased common shares; in 11 cases the government purchased subordinated debt; in 12 cases the government injected cash in the banks; in 2 cases credit was extended to the banks; and in 3 cases the government assumed bank liabilities. Even in cases where bad assets were purchased —“ as in Chile —“ dividends were suspended and all profits and recoveries had to be used to repurchase the bad assets. Of course in most cases multiple forms of government recapitalization of banks were used.

    But government purchase of bad assets was the exception rather than the rule. It was used only in Mexico, Japan, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Paraguay. Even in six of these seven cases where the recapitalization of banks occurred via the government purchase of bad assets such recapitalization was a combination of purchase of bad assets together with other forms of recapitalization (such as government purchase of preferred shares or subordinated debt).

    In the Scandinavian banking crises (Sweden, Norway, Finland) that are a model of how a banking crisis should be resolved there was not government purchase of bad assets; most of the recapitalization occurred through various injections of public capital in the banking system. Purchase of toxic assets instead —“ in most cases in which it was used —“ made the fiscal cost of the crisis much higher and expensive (as in Japan and Mexico).

    Thus the claim by the Fed and Treasury that spending $700 billion of public money is the best way to recapitalize banks has absolutely no factual basis or justification. This way of recapitalizing financial institutions is a total rip-off that will mostly benefit —“ at a huge expense for the US taxpayer - the common and preferred shareholders and even unsecured creditors of the banks. Even the late addition of some warrants that the government will get in exchange of this massive injection of public money is only a cosmetic fig leaf of dubious value as the form and size of such warrants is totally vague and fuzzy.

    So this rescue plan is a huge and massive bailout of the shareholders and the unsecured creditors of the financial firms (not just banks but also other non bank financial institutions); with $700 billion of taxpayer money the pockets of reckless bankers and investors have been made fatter under the fake argument that bailing out Wall Street was necessary to rescue Main Street from a severe recession. Instead, the restoration of the financial health of distressed financial firms could have been achieved with a cheaper and better use of public money.

    Indeed, the plan also does not address the need to recapitalize those financial institutions that are badly undercapitalized: this could have been achieved by using some of the $700 billion to inject public funds in ways other and more effective than a purchase of toxic assets: via public injections of preferred shares into these firms; via required matching injections of Tier 1 capital by current shareholders to make sure that such shareholders take first tier loss in the presence of public recapitalization; via suspension of dividends payments; via a conversion of some of the unsecured debt into equity (a debt for equity swap). All these actions would have implied a much lower fiscal costs for the government as they would have forced the shareholders and creditors of the banks to contribute to the recapitalization of the banks. So less than $700 billion of public money could have been spent if the private shareholders and creditors had been forced to contribute to the recapitalization; and whatever the size of the public contribution were to be its distribution between purchases of bad assets and more efficient and fair forms of recapitalization (preferred shares, common shares, sub debt) should have been different. For example if the private sector had done its fair matching share only $350 billion of public money could have been used; and of this $350 billion half could have taken the form of purchase of bad assets and the other half should have taken the form of injection of public capital in these financial institutions. So instead of purchasing —“ most likely at an excessive price - $700 billion of toxic assets the government could have achieved the same result —“ or a better result of recapitalizing the banks —“ by spending only $175 billion in the direct purchase of toxic assets. And even after the government will waste $700 billion buying toxic assets many banks that have not yet provisioned for such losses/writedowns will be even more undercapitalized than before. So this plan does not even achieve the basic objective of recapitalizing undercapitalized banks.

    The Treasury plan also does not explicitly include an HOLC-style program to reduce across the board the debt burden of the distressed household sector; without such a component the debt overhang of the household sector will continue to depress consumption spending and will exacerbate the current economic recession.

    Thus, the Treasury plan is a disgrace: a bailout of reckless bankers, lenders and investors that provides little direct debt relief to borrowers and financially stressed households and that will come at a very high cost to the US taxpayer. And the plan does nothing to resolve the severe stress in money markets and interbank markets that are now close to a systemic meltdown. It is pathetic that Congress did not consult any of the many professional economists that have presented - many on the RGE Monitor Finance blog forum - alternative plans that were more fair and efficient and less costly ways to resolve this crisis. This is again a case of privatizing the gains and socializing the losses; a bailout and socialism for the rich, the well-connected and Wall Street. And it is a scandal that even Congressional Democrats have fallen for this Treasury scam that does little to resolve the debt burden of millions of distressed home owners.

    Posted Monday Sep 29, 2008 23:49 #
  5. MikeT
    Member

    thanks, spatny, for the informative articles on this mess. Guess what? When I was driving home today I heard an interview with a Representative who voted No on the Paulson pkg. He basically recited the material contained in this thread - about how ill advised it wd be to do the bailout in THIS manner - purchasing 'toxic assets'; he further said there other models to use in which to do it better.

    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 01:07 #
  6. ChrisHajer
    Member

    http://www.saveusnotthem.com/

    Give each US citizen $1 Million Dollars.

    Reason: We get pushed around by banks and corporations on a daily basis. Their poor investments, bad decisions, and predatory practices created this problem. Now we have to put up with it. We should be rewarded for having to put up with them. The estimated population of the United States is 305,276,644*, which means this plan reduces the bail-out package by $699,694,723,356.

    This does not apply to the following people:

    • People who are already millionaires.
    • Cast, Crew, or Producers of any reality show. (e.g. The Hills, The OC, Survivor)
    • The evil that is Nancy Grace.
    • Anyone who owns a pair of crocs.
    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 15:16 #
  7. ChrisHajer
    Member

    I don't think the math works out...

    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 15:29 #
  8. spatny
    Member

    Guess what, Chicken-Little Paulson - the sky did not fall. We didn't need to give you the money by midnight. A couple of incredibly voracious banks that bent the rules to load mortgages on people that couldn't afford them went down. The stock market guys pee'd in their pants and then looked to make a buck. But the guys that ran the companies you "saved" made out like the bandits they are. There is a nice slide show on MSN today that shows what the Fannies and Freddies and AIGs and all the rest walked with. These people are disgraceful - and their greed knows no bounds. But of course we knew that.

    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 16:20 #
  9. spatny
    Member

    The Bailout And CEO Pay: What's —˜Excessive'?

    VOICE
    HONORS (2)
    By Sarah Anderson and Sam Pizzigati
    September 23rd, 2008
    Related Topics: An Economy for All Bailout Corporate Accountability DebateWeNeed
    Submitted by Sarah Anderson
    Outside of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Republican leaders in the White House and Congress, just about everybody who's anybody on the national political scene agrees with the notion that the financial bailout must include constraints on executive compensation.
    Both of our major presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, are insisting that the bailout must not enrich the already rich.
    In Congress, top Democrats are singing the same song.
    But the lyrics have been rather indistinct. The latest Democratic leadership proposal we've seen would give the Treasury Secretary the vague power to exclude incentives for executives of bailed-out companies that he deems to be “inappropriate or excessive.—
    Let's keep in mind that our current Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, spent his previous life on Wall Street, most recently as the CEO of investment banking giant Goldman Sachs. Paulson accumulated, as a reward for his executive labors, a personal stock stash that's still worth, even after the Wall Street meltdown, $523.5 million.
    Is this the person we want defining what level of executive pay qualifies as “inappropriate—?
    We need a more impartial arbiter. Peter Drucker, the founder of modern management science, would have been perfect. Drucker passed away three years ago, but he did leave behind a body of wisdom that we ought now be tapping.
    Business enterprises, Drucker preached, operate most efficiently and effectively when they keep the gap between worker and executive pay within a reasonable range. Wide gaps between executives and workers, as a Business Week appreciation of his work noted last week, undermine “the kind of teamwork that most businesses require to succeed.—
    What sort of gap did Drucker consider reasonable? No executives, he believed, should make over 25 times more than their workers. Top American executives last year, says a recent Institute for Policy Studies report, took home on average 344 times more than worker pay.
    Imagine if we had a bailout that would only move tax dollars to companies where executives make no more than 25 times what their workers receive. The executives at these companies would actually have a vested personal interest in sharing rewards with their workers. The more their workers make, the more they could make.
    Today, the incentives in our economy all run the other way. Executives make their money by exploiting workers, not sharing with them.
    That's the incentive structure that put us in our current economic predicament. That's the incentive structure the emerging bailout could —” and should —” start ending.

    Sarah Anderson directs the Global Economy Project at the Institute for Policy Studies. Sam Pizzigati, an Institute associate fellow, edits Too Much, an online weekly on excess and inequality. They are co-authors of the recently released report Executive Excess 2008: How Average Taxpayers Subsidize Runaway Pay.

    Repeat: "Let's keep in mind that our current Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, spent his previous life on Wall Street, most recently as the CEO of investment banking giant Goldman Sachs. Paulson accumulated, as a reward for his executive labors, a personal stock stash that's still worth, even after the Wall Street meltdown, $523.5 million."

    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 16:28 #
  10. spatny
    Member

    Paulson and his cohorts telling us we need to give him this money by midnight is like Woody Allen saying to the teller: "I have a gub." Already many better ideas have surfaced, and more will appear. Paulson should go back to Goldman Sachs and stand on the bridge and go down with it. These crooks loaded all this crap on a populace blinded by greed. Now all those people that bought homes on speculation can rent them, or eat them. The general population is not required to fill them for them. As, for example, the VC, a case in point. "Build them and they will cum" - and now they have to pay, and the price won't be $2.

    Posted Tuesday Sep 30, 2008 18:33 #

RSS feed for this topic

Reply »

You must log in to post.